Collective intentionality vs. Intersubjctive and social intentionality. An account of collective intentionality as shared intentionality by De Vecchi, Francesca
abstract
keywords
Collective intentionality; intersubjective intentionality; social intentionality; social 
cognition; cognitive, practical and affective intentionality; shared intentionality
FRANCESCA DE VECCHI
Università Vita-Salute San Raffaele
francesca.devecchi@unisr.it
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY VS. 
INTERSUBJECTIVE AND SOCIAL 
INTENTIONALITY. AN ACCOUNT OF 
COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY  
AS SHARED INTENTIONALITY
I will shed light on the phenomenon of collective intentionality, which, in the philosophical, 
cognitive sciences and neurosciences debate, is often confused with similar yet diverse 
phenomena, i.e. with intersubjective intentionality, also called social cognition, and with social 
intentionality. In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality, I shall present 
a taxonomy of collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and consider a thesis about 
shared intentionality. The taxonomy intends to show that although collective, intersubjective 
and social intentionality are very close phenomena, nonetheless they are different types 
of intentionality, and that, like individual intentionality, collective and intersubjective 
intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality – practical, affective and cognitive – 
which have to be distinguished. The sharing thesis, I will argue for, maintains that collective 
intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the term “sharing”, a sense 
that implies some essential conditions, which are not required in the cases of intersubjective 
and social intentionality. Finally I  shall point out that intersubjective intentionality is the basis 
and the necessary condition for collective and social intentionality.
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In order to shed light on the nature and on the structure of collective 
intentionality, I will present a taxonomy, which distinguishes collective 
intentionality from social and intersubjective intentionality. The aim of this 
taxonomy is to clarify the philosophical debate about collective intentionality 
and social cognition with regard to some basic confusions concerning 
the different phenomena and the correlated meanings of “collective 
intentionality”, “social intentionality” and “intersubjective intentionality”. 
I maintain that although intersubjective, social and collective intentionality 
are very close phenomena, nonetheless, they represent different types of 
intentionality. I will also state that, like individual intentionality, collective 
and intersubjective intentionality involve different kinds of intentionality: 
practical, affective and cognitive.
The taxonomy I present here is based on early phenomenological 
contributions on collective, intersubjective and social intentionality and on 
social ontology1. The taxonomy also refers to some of the recent accounts of 
collective intentionality and social cognition2.
I am going to develop my taxonomy discussing eight conceptual 
distinctions:
(i) Collective intentionality vs. Intersubjective intentionality;
(ii) Collective intentionality vs. Social intentionality;
(iii) Intersubjective intentionality vs. Social intentionality;
(iv) Cognitive vs. Practical vs. Affective collective intentionality;
(v) Cognitive vs. Affective vs. Practical Intersubjective intentionality;
(vi) Affective collective intentionality vs. Affective intersubjective 
intentionality;
(vii) Practical collective intentionality vs. Practical intersubjective 
intentionality;
(viii) Social entities created by social intentionality vs. social entities 
created by collective intentionality vs. social entities created by 
intersubjective intentionality.
Secondly, I am going to argue for a thesis on shared intentionality: I will 
maintain that, differently from social and intersubjective intentionality, 
1 See: Husserl (1905-1920, 1912-1928), Reinach (1911, 1913), Stein (1917, 1922, 1925), 
Scheler (19263) Hildebrand (1930), Walther (1923); about the early phenomenological 
accounts, see Mulligan (1987), Smith (1990), De Vecchi (2008, 2009, 2010).
2 See: Searle (1990, 1995, 2010), Bratman (1992), Tuomela-Miller (1988), Gilbert (1989, 
2002), Ferraris (2009), Gallagher-Zavahi (2008), Gallese (2005), Goldman (2005).
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collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the 
term “sharing”, a sense that implies some essential conditions, which are 
not required in the cases of intersubjective and social intentionality.
First of all, I will focus on three basic levels of phenomenological 
distinctions. I maintain that intersubjective, social and collective 
intentionality are different types of intentionality:
(i) Collective intentionality vs. Intersubjective intentionality;
For instance: we intend to go to the movies together vs. I see that you 
intend to go to the movies.
(ii) Collective intentionality vs. Social intentionality;
For instance: we intend to go to the movies together vs. I promise you 
to go to the movies with you.
(iii) Intersubjective intentionality vs. Social intentionality.
For instance: I see that you intend to go to the movies vs. I promise you 
to go to the movies with you.
These first distinctions are grounded in some basic notions and 
phenomenological data concerning collective, intersubjective and 
social intentionality. I will now deal with these basic notions and 
phenomenological data, and introduce further distinctions.
Collective intentionality is constituted by mental states or acts shared by 
two or more persons. The mental states or acts may be practical, cognitive 
or affective: hence, intentions (or volitions or desires), beliefs (or perceptions) or 
feelings (including all the variety of feelings: moods, emotions, passions etc.) 
respectively. Thus, I will also focus on a fourth level of distinctions:
(iv) Cognitive vs. Practical vs. Affective collective intentionality3.
For instance: We believe that Hereafter by Clint Eastwood is a beautiful 
movie vs. we intend to go to see Hereafter vs. we both are moved by 
Hereafter and we share the same enthusiasm for this movie.
We may already see that, among these different kinds of collective 
intentionality, the more problematic phenomenon to grasp and to define is 
affective collective intentionality: what exactly does it mean that we share 
1. 
A taxonomy 
of collective, 
intersubjective 
and social 
intentionality
1.1.
Collective 
intentionality
3 The distinction between practical collective intentionality and cognitive collective 
intentionality is now quite accepted (Gilbert 1989, Gilbert 2002, Bratman 1999, Searle 
2010, Zaibert 2003, Tollefsen 2005, Schmid 2009). The individuation of affective collective 
intentionality as a third kind of intentionality, internal to the type of collective 
intentionality, on the other hand, is much more recent (see Schmid 2009), and not widely 
adopted. Michael Tomasello seems still to give a priority to cognitive states: he talks 
about «cognitive representations» for both collective intentions and collective beliefs, 
without paying particular attention to affective states (Tomasello 2009).
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the same feeling, that we feel it together or collectively4? In which specific 
sense are “we both moved by Hereafter”? Which are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for collective affective intentionality? In this paper, I 
will deal with these questions and attempt to provide an answer to them.
Moreover, I will focus on a very relevant phenomenological issue. I have 
said that collective intentionality is constituted by mental states or acts. 
Considering the above mentioned examples of cognitive, practical and 
affective collective intentionality, it is maybe already manifest why I spoke 
of both mental states and acts. In fact, our collective belief that Hereafter is a 
beautiful movie is a collective mental state; instead, our collective intention to 
go to see Hereafter together is a collective act. Thus, what is an act and why 
is it different from a state? In philosophy, and also in common language, the 
meaning of “act” is ambiguous. Analytic philosophers tend to call mental 
acts mental states and tend to identify acts with actions. Phenomenologists, 
on the contrary, distinguish among states, acts and actions, and hold this 
distinction to be very important. I agree with this distinction, and in this 
paper I will always adopt it and I will refer to states, acts and actions as very 
different intentional phenomena. 
Hence, what are acts and what are actions? Differently from mental 
states, acts are characterised by positionality: acts involve or presuppose 
taking a position (yes-no) relative to an object or to a state-of-affairs. 
Actions are goal-directed intentional movements: they are intended 
bodily movements which aim to satisfy the content of the intention. 
Let us consider just the case of intention: different from beliefs or from 
perceptions, which are mental states, intentions are acts in that they 
involve taking a position. A bodily movement which satisfies an intention 
is an action.
It is worth noting that among analytical philosophers, John Searle’s account 
of intention presents a very interesting intermediary position between 
phenomenology and analytical philosophy: although Searle does not speak 
of “mental acts” but only of “mental states” and “actions” (and also of 
“speech acts”), he distinguishes between “prior intention” and “intention-
in-action”: “prior intentions begin prior to the onset of an action and 
intentions-in-action are the intentional components of actions” (Searle 
2010, p. 51). Thus, the prior intentions Searle speaks about are exactly what 
in phenomenology are referred to as intentions, i.e. acts. In my paper I will 
speak much more about collective intentions, i.e. collective practical acts, 
and less about collective actions5.
4 Hans-Bernhard Schmid has dealt with this problem in depth (see Schmid 2009).
5About the phenomenological theory of acts, see Reinach (1911a) and De Monticelli (2007, 2007a and 2009). 
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Intersubjective intentionality is constituted by mental states or acts of one 
or more persons directed to the understanding of experiences of others. 
Intersubjective intentionality may be affective or cognitive. Affective 
and cognitive intersubjective intentionality are respectively directed 
to the understanding of affective and cognitive experiences of other persons. 
For instance: I see that you are thinking about your next lecture; I see 
that you are feeling joy. Moreover, we may also identify a third kind of 
intersubjective intentionality: practical intersubjective intentionality. This may 
be, for example, the case in which I see your intention to do something.
The distinction among affective intersubjective intentionality, cognitive 
intersubjective intentionality and practical intersubjective intentionality 
has not yet been really adopted in philosophy: philosophers, but also and 
especially psychologists, cognitive scientists and neuroscientists tend to 
speak generically of social cognition which may indistinctly concern the 
understanding of cognitive, affective and practical experiences of other 
subjects. In other terms, “social cognition” means intersubjectivity, without 
distinguishing among cognitive, practical and affective intersubjectivity. 
Consistent with the phenomenological tradition, I distinguish, rather, 
among cognitive, affective and practical intersubjective intentionality: they 
are three different phenomena indeed.
Thus, I will focus on a fifth level of distinctions:
(v) Cognitive vs. Affective vs. Practical Intersubjective intentionality.
For instance: I see that you are thinking about Hereafter vs. I see that you are 
still moved by and enthusiastic about Hereafter vs. I see that you intend to go 
to see Hereafter again. 
One of the aims of my taxonomy is to show that affective intersubjective 
intentionality is not to be confused with affective collective intentionality, 
and that practical intersubjective intentionality is not to be confused 
with practical collective intentionality. The possibility of this confusion is 
directly connected with the criteria of characterisation of intersubjective 
intentionality. 
Firstly, we may characterise the kind of intersubjective intentionality 
through the content of mental states or acts: I see your intention, I see your 
belief, I see your feeling. Now, according to this characterisation, if I see 
your intention, this is a case of practical intersubjective intentionality; if I 
see your belief, this is a case of cognitive intersubjective intentionality; if I 
see your feeling, this is a case of affective intersubjective intentionality. 
Secondly, we may also characterise the kind of intersubjective 
intentionality in a stronger way, not only through the content but also 
through the quality of the mental states or acts: I intend your intention, I 
1.2. 
Intersubjective 
intentionality 
1.2.1. 
Intersubjective 
intentionality 
vs. collective 
intentionality
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feel your feeling, I believe your belief6. According to this second criterion 
of characterisation, I may see your intention, your belief, your feeling 
only if I personally have the same experience you have: only if I intend 
your intention, I believe your belief, I feel your feeling7. 
These different criteria of characterisation depend on which account of 
intersubjective intentionality (social cognition) we adopt8. In any case, it is 
clear that if we adopt the second and stronger criterion of characterisation 
of intersubjective intentionality, then it is more difficult to distinguish 
between intersubjective affective intentionality on the one hand, and 
collective affective intentionality on the other, and between intersubjective 
practical intentionality on the one hand, and collective practical 
intentionality on the other.
Nonetheless, I think that, even if we adopt the stronger criterion of 
characterisation, we can distinguish among these different types and kinds 
of intentionality.
Just consider these examples: if I feel your joy (I share your joy), it does 
not mean that you share my joy, too. In the same way, if I intend your 
intention, and so share your intention, it does not imply that you share my 
intention, too. My point is the following: these are not cases of collective 
intentionality because we do not intend together and we do not feel 
together. The content of the intentions and feelings are certainly the 
same in both of the subjects involved, you and me: you intend x, I intend 
6 The distinction between content and quality of intentional experiences is a classic 
phenomenological distinction: we find it already in the early Husserl (1901). This is also a 
classic analytical distinction: in Searle we find the intentional content versus intentional 
mode distinction (Searle 1983).
7 Particularly in the case of intersubjective affective intentionality it makes sense to adopt 
the stronger criterion: it really could be difficult to see that you are feeling joy or pain 
without feeling it. This is also the position of phenomenologists like Scheler and Stein: 
according to them, empathy (called Nachfühlung by Scheler and, more traditionally, 
Einfühlung by Stein), the act by which I see the feeling of the other, is characterised by the 
affective nuance of knowing. Scheler speaks properly of a «verstehen fühlend» (see Scheler 
19263 and Stein 1917).
8 There are different accounts which try to describe or explain the phenomenon of 
intersubjective intentionality or social cognition. The crucial problem is: how do I 
understand the experiences of others? Do I understand them by inferences (the inference 
which I can make from the expressions or bodily appearance of the other and from my 
own experience)? Do I understand them by simulating them? Do I understand them by 
feeling them, if they are feeling, by intending them, if they are intentions etc.? Can I 
understand the experiences of the others without engaging myself in such experiences? 
Neurosciences maintain that mirror neurons are the heroes of social cognition. But the 
neurobiological data are interpreted in many ways according to the different accounts 
(Simulation theory, Theory of Mind, called also Theory-theory etc.). About this debate, see 
Gallese (2005, 2011), Goldman (2005), Rizzolati-Sinigaglia (2007), Gallagher-Zahavi (2008).
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x; you feel joy, I feel joy. But the direction of the intentionality in the case of 
intersubjective intentionality is always and only an I-you direction, i.e. a 
direction from I to you: by seeing your intention or feeling, I intend the 
same intention you intend, I feel the same joy you feel. Instead, in the case 
of collective intentionality, the direction of the intentionality is always 
a we-shared object direction: a direction from we (I and you) to a common, 
shared object (see infra § 2.1., 2.2.).
Moreover – and strictly connected with the direction of intentionality 
issue – the role of the subjects involved is different. The subjects of collective 
intentionality are always agent-partners: we all intend or feel together. 
Instead, the subjects involved in intersubjective intentionality are not 
agent-partners: I am the only agent; you are not another agent. Only I 
intend, only I feel – your intention, your feeling. 
I would also mention another possible borderline case between 
intersubjective affective intentionality and collective affective 
intentionality. I refer here to the case of emotional contagion in which I 
am affected by your emotion: I feel joy because I am swayed by your joy, 
I have absorbed it without being aware of it; in other terms, I do not feel 
joy at a personal level, I do not have a first personal perspective towards 
the joy I feel (see infra § 2.3). Also in this case, it is manifest that we (I and 
you) de facto feel the same feeling, but also in this case the direction of 
intentionality remains an intersubjective direction from I to you and the 
role of the subjects involved is not an agent-partners’ role.
Thus, with respect to the question I have posed – what exactly does 
it mean to say that we share the same feeling, that we feel it together 
or collectively? – I can firstly state that it means that in the case of 
collective or shared intentionality: (i) the intentionality direction of the 
subjects involved is towards a common object (and not, as in the case 
of intersubjective intentionality, directed from one subject to the other 
subject); (ii) all of the subjects involved perform an agent-partner role.
Moreover, we will see that collective intentionality, and particularly 
collective affective intentionality, must satisfy further conditions in order 
to exist (see infra § 2.2.).
The conclusion of this argument is that I can focus on a sixth and seventh 
level of distinctions:
(vi) Affective collective intentionality vs. Affective intersubjective 
intentionality. 
For instance: we are both moved by Hereafter and we share the 
same enthusiasm for this movie vs. I see (I feel) your emotion and 
enthusiasm for Hereafter .
(vii) Practical collective intentionality vs. Practical intersubjective intentionality.
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For instance: we intend to go to see Hereafter together vs. I see (I intend) 
your intention to go to see Hereafter.
Social intentionality is constituted by social acts performed by one or more 
persons in the very act of speaking, addressed to one or more persons and 
grasped by them. Social acts are promising, commanding, informing, demanding, 
promulgating etc9. As acts, they are experiences which involve and presuppose 
taking a position, thus they are characterised by authorship or agency10.
Differently from collective and intersubjective mental states and acts, social 
acts need to be communicated to their addressees and grasped by them. 
Social acts are speech acts – most of them are declarations, as Searle affirms11. 
Hence, the nature of social intentionality is essentially communicative and 
linguistic: social intentionality can be performed only if it is linguistically 
addressed to the addressees and grasped by them.
I will here make some remarks on a point concerning Searle’s conception of 
social intentionality, social acts and speech acts. According to Searle, social 
intentionality, social acts and speech acts can be subsumed under collective 
intentionality (Searle 1995, 2010 pp. 48-50). Thus, Searle would not probably 
agree with the distinction between collective and social intentionality I 
make. Why? What does Searle mean? And why – on the contrary – do I 
think that his perspective is not completely adequate for elucidating the 
phenomenon of social acts?
1.3. 
Social 
intentionality
9 Social acts were discovered and defined by Adolf Reinach, a phenomenologist and 
philosopher of law who was a student of Edmund Husserl at the beginning of XX century 
(Reinach 1911, 1913). Before Reinach, Thomas Reid had already spoken of «social 
operations» (Reid 1788). Reinach’s social acts anticipate by some fifty years the discovery 
of Austin’s speech acts (Austin, 1969). About a history of social and speech acts, see 
Smith (1990), Mulligan (1987), Shuhmann-Smith (1990), De Vecchi (2010).
10 More precisely, social acts are «spontaneous» and free acts, and have a second order 
positionality: their taking a position presupposes a previous taking of a position. 
Consider these examples: promising presupposes a will, informing presupposes a 
conviction, asking a question presupposes an uncertainty etc. In all these cases, social 
acts are manifestly second order position-takings because they presuppose first order 
position-takings such as, accordingly with the examples mentioned, the will, conviction 
and uncertainty. In other terms, in social acts, we take a position with respect to 
positions which we have already taken, and we turn these previous position-takings 
into the ground of an act. For instance, you told me a story, and I did not understand 
exactly how it ended; now, I can take a position about it: I can endorse or ignore my 
state of uncertainty and curiosity about it. If I endorse it, this state of uncertainty may 
be the basis for another position-taking, a higher order position; I may turn this state of 
uncertainty into the ground of asking you about the end of the story (see Reinach 1911a, 
1913: § 3; Stein 1922; Husserl 1912-1928: § 61; De Monticelli 2007a).
11 See Searle (1969, 1995, 2010), Mulligan (1987), Smith (1990), De Vecchi (2010).
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According to Searle, the intentionality of language, and thus the 
intentionality of social and speech acts, derives from the intentionality of the 
mind. Now, in order to perform a social act, i.e. linguistically address another 
individual (the addressee) who grasps the act, the individual, agent of the 
act, must have a preceding representation of the act itself, representation 
which is already collective. In fact, according to Searle, the content of the 
representation involves the other individual; thus it is collective before the 
agent of the act communicates it to the addressee and before the addressee 
exists and grasps the act. In this sense, the social and linguistic moment of the 
act ontologically depends on the collective moment – the capability to refer 
to other subjects – belonging to the intentionality of every individual12.
This is a very significant point characterising Searle’s individualism and 
internalism: it implies that, in order to perform a social act, a collective 
moment must already be present in the individual mind, and that the 
individual’s capacity for collective intentionality grounds the sociality of 
social acts. This perspective keeps Searle apart from other philosophers like 
Anthonie Meijers and Hans-Bernhard Schmid, who state that a concrete and 
real relational moment is ontologically necessary in order for a collective 
intentionality to exist (Meijers 1994, Schmid 2009)13.
Now, why do I think that Searle’s perspective does not adequately account 
for the phenomenon of social acts? Because it does not show that social 
acts and collective acts have different existential conditions and different 
essential structure. Phenomenologically, the essential character of social acts 
is their need do be communicated to and grasped by their addressees; on the 
contrary it is not an essential character of collective intentionality and of 
intersubjective intentionality. Thus, on the basis of this essential difference, I 
state that social acts are not reducible to collective states or acts. 
A very specific characteristic of social intentionality is that it creates social 
ontology, and precisely normative and institutional entities belonging to social 
ontology. For instance, if I promise you to do something, my promise 
produces an obligation and a claim.
Social ontology is also produced by collective intentionality and in some 
cases also by intersubjective intentionality. The taxonomy also focuses on 
the different roles and contributions of social, intersubjective and collective 
intentionality in the construction of social reality.
12 See Searle (2010: 48-50): “There is a ground-floor form of collective intentionality, 
one that exists prior to the excercise of language and which makes the use of language 
possibile at all (50)”.
13 For a very clear presentation of the salient issues of the internalism versus externalism 
collective intentionality debate and also a defence of Searle’s internalism, see Gallotti 
(2010, Third Chapter).
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Thus, I will lastly focus on an eighth level of distinctions:
(viii) Social entities created by social intentionality vs. social entities 
created by collective intentionality vs. social entities created by 
intersubjective intentionality.
For instance: promising creates obligations and claims vs. 
collective beliefs create philosophical societies, political parties 
etc. vs. intersubjective feelings create groups of friends, families, 
communities etc.
I state that, differently from social and intersubjective intentionality, 
collective intentionality is a shared intentionality in a very strong sense of the 
term «sharing», a sense that implies three essential conditions in the case of 
practical and cognitive collective intentionality and four essential conditions 
in the case of affective collective intentionality. Singularly, these conditions 
are necessary conditions, and jointly they are also sufficient conditions.
This thesis would also try to give an answer to the previously mentioned 
question regarding collective affective intentionality: what exactly 
does it mean that we share the same feeling, that we feel it together or 
collectively? (see supra § 1.1)?
This thesis develops what I have stated previously concerning the 
distinction between affective intersubjective intentionality on the one 
hand, and affective collective intentionality on the other, and about the 
distinction between practical collective intentionality on the one hand, and 
practical intersubjective intentionality on the other (see supra § 1.2). This 
thesis also develops the previously mentioned point regarding the role of 
the subjects in collective intentionality (see supra § 1.2).
Collective intentions and collective beliefs are a shared intentionality which 
requires three conditions:
(i) Intentional quality and intentional content condition;
(ii) Mutual belief condition;
(iii) Agent-partners role condition.
These conditions are jointly essential conditions for collective intentions 
and also collective beliefs as shared intentionality. In other terms, these 
conditions specify the sense – a very strong one – in which collective 
intentions (volitions or desires) and collective beliefs are indeed shared 
intentions and shared beliefs.
Consider the following collective intentions (i.e. a case of practical collective 
intentionality) state-of-affairs (the case of collective beliefs may be built 
symmetrically):
2. 
The sharing 
thesis: collective 
intentionality 
is a shared 
intentionality
2.1. 
Collective 
intentions and 
collective 
beliefs are 
shared 
intentions 
and beliefs
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(i) We intend to go to the movies together14.
 Firstly, state-of-affairs (i) implies trivially an intentional quality and intentional 
content condition. It implies that:
(ii) We have an intentional act of the same quality: an intention;
(iii) My intention and your intention have the same content: to go to the movies 
together.
It is important to stress this condition, because we could have intentional acts of the 
same type (practical intentionality) and with the same content (to go to the movies 
together) but of different quality: I could have the intention to go to the movies 
together and you could have only the desire to go to the movies together. Thus, in this 
case, there would of course not be collective intentions15.
Secondly, state-of-affairs (i) also presupposes a mutual belief condition. It presupposes that:
(iv) I believe that you intend for us to go to the movies together;
(v) You believe that I intend for us to go to the movies together16. 
Hence,
(vi) We believe that we intend the same goal17.
Finally, state-of-affairs (i) entails an agent-partner role condition:
(vii) We (you and I) are both agents of the intention to go to the movies 
together.
The agent-partner role condition concerns the role of agent-partners that all of the 
subjects involved necessarily have with respect to the common goal to go to the 
movies together: we are all agents of this collective intention.
This condition, of course, does not require that the content of our shared intention 
necessarily be the same with respect to the part I have to perform in order to carry 
out our intended goal: in order to do x together, I may have to do x1 (my part) and 
you may have to do x2 (your part)18.
14 I assume here Searle’s account of collective intentions which does not reduce collective intentions 
to individual intentions plus mutual beliefs (1990, 1995, 2010).
15 Moreover, I have to remember that intentions and desires have different conditions of 
satisfaction (see Searle 2010, Zaibert 2003, Zaibert-Smith 2006).
16 According to Searle, the belief about the intention of the other (i.e. about the fact that the other 
– like me – intends x, too), and viceversa, cannot be a content of the intention, because intentions 
are self-referential mental states, and hence cannot concern the intention of other persons than 
myself. This mutual belief about the intention of others is present aside from the intention and is 
presupposed by the intention (see Searle 2010, chapter III). On this point, I agree with Searle.
17 The mutual belief condition (expressed in (i), (iv)-(vi), in case of «intention-in-action» does not 
require that each of us exactly know what the other does (see Searle 2010). This condition requires 
only that I believe that you intend and cooperate towards the same goal and that you believe 
that I intend and cooperate towards the same goal. In the case of collective intentionality of high 
complexity (for example, the collective intentionality of a corporation, of a state’s government, or 
more simply of a theater company), it is rare that each member knows the part-intention (and the 
part-action) of every other member.
18 See Searle (1990, 1995, 2010).
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I claim that these three conditions jointly characterise collective intentions 
and collective beliefs as such, i.e. as shared intentionality (I have not 
created a specific example for collective beliefs, but the reader can proceed 
to the substitution of the intentions and their intentional contents with 
beliefs: for instance, “we believe that we will go to the movies together”). 
To summarize, we intend together and we believe together, only under the 
conditions that each of us:
(i) has the same intentional act (intention) or state (belief) and the 
same intentional content; 
(ii) is reciprocally aware that we share the same intended goal, the 
same belief;
(iii) jointly has the agent-partner’s role with respect to the common 
intended goal and the common belief.
I also state that these conditions are not essential conditions either for 
social intentionality or for intersubjective intentionality, and also maintain 
that neither social intentionality nor intersubjective intentionality are 
shared intentionality.
Collective feeling is a shared intentionality, which requires four conditions:
(i) Intentional quality, intensity and content condition;
(ii) Mutual belief condition;
(iii) Agent-partner role condition;
(iv) Subjects’ relation towards the object condition.
These conditions are jointly essential conditions for collective affective 
intentionality as shared intentionality. Consider the following collective feeling 
state-of-affairs:
(i) We both feel enthusiasm for Hereafter.
Firstly, state-of-affairs (i) trivially implies an intentional quality and intentional 
content condition. It implies that: 
(ii) We have the same quality of intentional act: a feeling, and 
precisely, a feeling of enthusiasm;
(iii) My feeling and your feeling have the same content: enthusiasm 
with respect to Hereafter.
As we have previously remarked for collective intentions, it is important to focus 
our attention on this condition because we could have intentional acts of the same 
type (affective intentionality) and with the same content (Hereafter) but of different 
quality: I could feel enthusiasm for Hereafter, and you could simply feel joy for 
Hereafter. Thus, in this case, there would of course not be collective feelings.
Moreover, besides the same intentional quality and content, state-of-affairs 
(i) also implies that the intensity of the feeling is the same. Feelings have 
2.2. 
Collective 
feeling is a 
shared feeling
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degrees, and in order to share the same feeling we have to share a feeling of 
the same degree, and not only of the same quality and content. Thus, state-
of-affairs (i) implies that:
(iv) We both feel the same degree of enthusiasm.
The degree of feeling also depends on the character of the person (there are 
persons who feel an emotion much more intensely vs. persons who feel an 
emotion less intensely) and on the life energy we have in the moment we 
experience a certain feeling19.
Secondly, state-of-affairs (i) also implicitly presupposes a mutual belief 
condition. It presupposes that:
(v) I believe that you feel enthusiasm for Hereafter;
(vi) You believe that I feel enthusiasm for Hereafter.
Hence,
(vii) We believe that we feel enthusiasm for Hereafter.
Thirdly, state-of-affairs (i) also entails an agent-partner role condition:
(viii) We (you and I) are both agents of the feeling (enthusiasm for 
Hereafter).
Finally, state-of-affairs (i) implies another condition concerning the subjects’ 
relation towards the object. All of the subjects involved must have the same 
relation towards the object which they feel a certain emotion for:
(ix) We (you and I) have the same relation towards Hereafter: we are 
both spectators of the movie.
If you were Clint Eastwood, the director of the movie, and I were simply 
a spectator of the movie, then we could not share the same feeling of 
enthusiasm.
In this regard, I would like now to mention Scheler’s famous case of 
feeling-together (Mit-einanderfühlen): a father and mother feel the same pain 
standing by the dead body of their beloved child. In this case, we properly 
have an example of “emotional sharing”20, which satisfies all the essential 
conditions for collective feeling that we have individuated. Moreover, 
Scheler’s example is very clear with respect to the subjects’ relation 
condition. As Scheler remarks, the friend of the family, who also feels 
pain for the dead child, does not share the same pain as that shared by the 
parents. He may only experience compassion or a fellow-feeling (Mit-gefühl) 
with respect to the parents’ pain. Why? Because he does not have the same 
relation that the parents have with the dead child.
It is manifest that this condition does not make sense with respect to 
collective intentions or collective beliefs: we could share the same intention 
19 See on this point the remarks of Edith Stein (Stein 1922). 
20 See Scheler (19263), and in this regard see: Schmid (2009, § 15 “Phenomenological 
Fusion”), Krebs (2010), Zahavi (2008).
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or the same belief, even if my relation  with the object towards which I have 
the intention or belief were different from yours.
Consider the following cognitive intersubjective intentionality state-of-affairs:
(i) I intend to go to the movies;
(ii) You understand that I intend to go to the movies;
 (i) and (ii) are essential moments of the intersubjective state-of-
affairs. 
There is a subject (I) that intends to go to the movies, and there is another 
subject (You) who understands the mental act of the first subject (I).
In this situation, can we properly speak of a shared intentionality implying 
the three above mentioned conditions: (i) Intentional quality and 
intentional content condition; (ii) Mutual belief condition; (iii) Agent-
partners’ role condition?
No, we cannot. There is here only a one-sided knowledge condition. Certainly, 
it may happen that: 
(iii) You intend to go to the movies, too;
(iv) You and I (We) intend to go to the movies.
But, even in this case, where we share the same intentional quality and the 
same intentional content, and thus satisfy one of the three conditions, we 
cannot describe (iii) saying that you share my intention in the same strong 
sense of sharing implied by collective intentionality. Because, in case 
(iii), we only have a one-sided sharing and not a mutual sharing: you share 
my intention, but I do not share your intention. In other terms, this is a case 
of practical intersubjective intentionality and not a case of practical collective 
intentionality.
To sum up, in this situation (i)-(iv) we do not have a proper shared or 
collective intentionality, but only an intersubjective intentionality: 
first, you know (understand) that I intend to go to the movies (cognitive 
intersubjective intentionality); second, you intend to go to the movies 
(the same intention I have), too (practical intersubjective intentionality). 
Apparently, we both intend to go to the movies, but we do not intend to go 
to the movies together. The I-intention and you-intention do not produce 
here a “we-intention”.
What about the agent-partners’ role condition in this case? Neither does this 
condition hold: you and I are both agents, but we are not agent-partners 
relative to the same-shared goal. My intention and your intention may have 
the same content (I intend to go to the movies and you intend to go to the 
movies) but we are not jointly the agents of the same intention: you have 
just the same intention I have, and you know that I have this intention. 
2.3. 
Intersubjective 
intentionality 
is not a shared 
intentionality 
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It is important to return now to the distinction between affective 
intersubjective intentionality on the one hand, and affective collective 
intentionality on the other, and to stress a very significant difference 
with regard to it. Affective intersubjective intentionality satisfies only 
the intentional quality and intentional content condition, and may also satisfy 
the claim about intensity, but it does not satisfy either the mutual belief 
condition or the agent-partners’ role conditions. On the contrary, as we 
have seen, affective collective intentionality entails all these conditions. 
Consider the following affective intersubjective intentionality states-of-affairs:
(i) I feel joy
(ii) You understand that I feel joy;
And maybe,
(iii) You feel joy, too
(iv) You and I feel joy.
In this case, differently from the affective collective intentionality case, we 
do not properly share the same feeling. You understand my feeling and, 
possibly, understanding it, you feel it, but a common feeling does not really 
exist. Each of us feels her/his feeling: my feeling and yours have the same 
quality and the same content and they could also have the same intensity, 
but we do not feel it together. This is the case of empathy (Einfühlung) 
and sympathy (Mitfühung) (or of forms of “social cognition” which are 
affectively marked)21. But this is not the case of collective affective 
intentionality: collective affective intentionality is realized only if the 
subjects share the feeling, only if their feeling is a “feeling-together”.
I maintain that intersubjective intentionality is in many cases the basis of 
collective and social intentionality. For instance, in the case of collective 
intentions and collective actions, in order to cooperate towards a common 
goal, a relation among the subjects, which is the basis of the agreement and 
the commitment towards the shared goal, is needed. This relation is created 
through intersubjective intentionality, particularly intersubjective affective 
intentionality, at the personal level (empathy and sympathy). This type 
of intentionality allows us to understand the others with whom we share 
intentions, beliefs etc. and with whom we perform social acts (promising, 
informing, asking, commanding etc.).
Phenomenologists like Husserl claim that the intersubjective relation is 
a necessary condition for social acts, for collective experiences and for 
the constitution of the social world. In intersubjective intentionality, 
and precisely in a mutual intersubjective intentionality where the role of 
2.3.2. 
Intersubjective 
intentionality 
grounds both 
collective and 
social inten-
tionality
21 See Lipps (1913), Stein (1917), Scheler (19263), Gallese (2005).
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agent is played by both the subjects (I see what you intend, believe or feel, 
and you see what I intend, believe or feel), even if probably in different 
temporal moments, Husserl identifies the situation which normally 
characterises interpersonal relations: we know each other and mostly we 
understand what the other intends, believes and feels. Thus, on the basis of 
this mutual understanding, which is proper of interpersonal relations, we 
may also perform social acts, have collective intentions, beliefs, feelings and 
generally have forms of collective experiences22. 
Hence, also in this case, phenomenology sees all the richness of the reality, 
and “save the phenomena”. In fact, I perform the social act to invite you 
to the movies with me, since there is an affective interpersonal relation 
between us (love, trust, esteem, respect etc.). Likewise, we have the 
collective intention to walk on the hills together, since we have feelings 
of trust, mutual sympathy and pleasure: I feel and believe that you are 
trustworthy and tomorrow you will come to the trip, and we like each 
other’s company. 
I agree with Husserl, and I maintain that affective intersubjective 
intentionality, conceived as a basic inter-personal relation, is a necessary 
condition – even if obviously not a sufficient condition – for collective 
intentionality and for the constitution of social entities like associations, 
groups, communities (rock bands, basket teams, orchestras, philosophical 
societies, families, marriages etc.).
On the contrary, philosophers like Searle say that collective intentions 
could also be intentions of an extremely solitary brain in a vat. Most 
philosophers and cognitive scientists – with rare exceptions – pay very 
little attention to the inter-personal relation, and in particolar the affective 
one, and do not claim that it is a necessary condition of each collective 
experience23.
Now, let us consider the following social intentionality state-of-affairs:
(i) I promise you to do x.
In order to be performed, a promise, as do all social acts, requires that the 
addressee grasps the act. So, (i) requires that:
(ii) You (the addressee) grasp my act of promising.
2.4. 
Social 
intentionality 
is not a shared 
intentionality 
22 See Husserl (1910), “Die für Sozialität konstitutiven Akte, die kommunikativen” and 
“Soziale Ontologie und deskriptive Soziologie”, in Husserl (1905-1920, p. 98, Beilage 
XVIII, p. 102-104, Beilage XVIII), and see Husserl (1912-1928, § 51 Die Personen in der 
Kollektivität der Personen).
23 See Searle (1990), Against Searlian individualism in collective intentionality and 
pro a collective intentionality based on relational intentionality, see Meijers (1994, 
p. 7), Bratman (1999), Schmid (2009, p. 37).
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(i) and (ii) imply a mutual knowledge condition:
(iii) You know that I promise you to do x.
(iv) I know that you have grasped my promise.
Hence, in the case of social intentionality, a knowledge condition is necessary: 
the promisee knows that the promisor promised something to her/him; and 
the promisor knows that the promisee grasped her/his promise. Thus, the 
content of the knowledge of the agent (the promisor) is different from the 
content of the knowledge of the addressee (the promisee).
Moreover, in social intentionality the agent-partner role condition fails.
For my act of promising to be performed, it is necessary that you be aware 
of my promise. But your being aware does not at all imply that you share 
my act of promising, i.e. that you also are promising me the same thing. It 
only implies that you are aware of my act: you are the addressee of the act, 
while I am the agent of the act. 
Thus, this situation clearly does not entail the agent-partner role condition. 
The two subjects play a different role: one subject is properly the agent 
who is the source of the act; the other is the addressee. The two subjects 
are complementary: they constitute a partnership, but the addressee is the 
counter partner of the agent, while in the case of collective intentionality all 
the subjects are agent-partners in the same way. 
In conclusion, social intentionality does not coincide with collective 
intentionality for at least two reasons: because it entails a knowledge 
condition, and because of the lack of the agent-partner role in all the 
subjects involved.
In order to elucidate the phenomenon of collective intentionality and 
to show its family resemblances and diversities with the phenomena of 
intersubjective and social intentionality, I have developed a taxonomy of 
collective, intersubjective and social intentionality, and I have argued a 
thesis on collective intentionality as shared intentionality.
My taxonomy has presented eight distinctions:
The (i)-(iii) distinctions stated that collective, intersubjective and social 
intentionality are different types of intentionality.
The (iv)-(v) distinctions claimed that, as in individual intentionality, there 
are different kinds of intentionality also in collective and intersubjective 
intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive.
The (vi)-(vii) distinctions focused on two kinds of collective and 
intersubjective intentionality which are often confused: practical collective 
intentionality vs. practical intersubjective intentionality; affective collective 
intentionality vs. affective intersubjective intentionality.
The (viii) distinction has remarked on the fact that all these types of 
3. 
Conclusions
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intentionality – collective, intersubjective and social intentionality – create 
social entities, but that each produces social entities of different kinds 
belonging to different levels of social ontology.
Secondly, I have argued a thesis on collective intentionality as shared 
intentionality: only collective intentionality – and not intersubjective and 
social intentionality – is a shared intentionality stricto sensu. This thesis 
aims to answer to the question: what exactly does it mean that we share 
the same feeling, the same intention, the same belief? The thesis identifies 
essential conditions for collective intentionality, precisely three essential 
conditions for collective intentions and collective beliefs, and four essential 
conditions for collective feelings.
We intend together and we believe together, only on the conditions that each of 
us:
(i) has the same intentional quality (the same act, i.e. intention, or the 
same state, i.e. belief) and the same intentional content; 
(ii) is reciprocally aware that we share the same intended goal, the same 
belief;
(iii) jointly has the agent-partner’s role with respect to the common 
intended goal and the common belief.
We feel together only on the conditions that each of us:
(i) has the same intentional quality (the same feeling), the same 
intensity of feeling and the same content of feeling;
(ii) is mutually aware that we share the same feeling; 
(iii) jointly has the agent-partner role condition with respect to the 
common feeling;
(iv) has the same subjects’ relation towards the object which we feel a 
certain emotion for.
I state that these conditions are not essential conditions either for 
intersubjective intentionality or for social intentionality.
Finally, I have also identified a foundation relation among collective, 
intersubjective and social intentionality: intersubjective intentionality 
is the basis and the necessary condition for collective and social 
intentionality.
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